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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF INAPPROPRIATELY RELIES UPON 
DISPUTED FACTS 
On November 8, 1993, the trial court entered an order 
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. The summary 
judgment and order states, as follows: 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
granted and plaintiff's complaint is dis-
missed with prejudice on the basis that, as a 
matter of law, service of the notice to pay 
rent or vacate, without more, constitutes a 
wrongful eviction, even though the rent may 
have been paid, since the evidence sets forth 
various alternatives and it was plaintiff who 
chose to quit the premises. 
In accordance with the general principle that findings of 
fact and conclusions of law need not be entered upon a ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment (see Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P.) 
the trial court did not enter any findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. 
Despite the fact the court granted summary judgment purely 
upon its application of the law and without regard to the 
surrounding facts and circumstances which may be in dispute, 
defendant's Brief is replete with references to facts it argues 
excuse serving a notice to pay rent or quit upon plaintiff even 
though no rent was due. For example, defendant argues plaintiff 
was negotiating a lease with another party and defendant "be-
lieved" plaintiff had not prepaid rent. See defendant's Brief at 
pp. 2, 3 and 6. Defendant also cites correspondence and tele-
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phone communications between the parties, the significance of 
which should be left to the trier of fact, not the appellate 
court. See defendant's Brief at p. 6. Defendant argues plain-
tiff did not vacate the premises until December 16, 1991. See 
defendant's Brief at p. 6. Additionally, defendant makes a bald 
assertion that plaintiff had legal assistance in responding to 
the notice to quit. See defendant's Brief at p. 11. 
The trial court made no findings of fact regarding these 
matters. These alleged facts are not relevant to this appeal. 
Plaintiff submits this appeal should focus on the sole legal 
issue upon which the court based its summary judgment and order. 
The trial court apparently determined that a wrongful notice to 
quit without additional physical acts of a landlord that inter-
fer with a tenant's enjoyment of the premises, does not consti-
tute constructive action. 
For the reasons more fully set forth in its opening Brief, 
Utah should not permit landlords to serve, with impunity, wrong-
ful notices to pay rent or quit upon their tenants. In cases 
such as the present case, when a tenant relies on improper notice 
to pay rent or quit and vacates the premises despite the fact 
that rent was not due, the tenant should have the right to seek a 
remedy against the landlord for the landlord's conduct. 
- 2 -
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF INTENT TO TERMINATE 
LEASE DID NOT EXCUSE OR JUSTIFY NOTICE TO QUIT 
With respect to the analogy set forth in plaintiff's opening 
Brief that a party who sets matters in motion should be held 
responsible for the consequences of those actions, defendant 
argues that plaintiff, rather than defendant, set events in 
motion in this case by sending a letter to defendant dated 
November 19, 1991, stating that plaintiff intended to vacate the 
premises by December 21, 1991 if the parties could not negotiate 
a new lease term. 
Plaintiff submits the correspondence between the parties 
should not be considered by the appellate court in this appeal. 
However, even if this court considers the November 19 letter in 
its analysis of this case, defendant's argument that plaintiff's 
alleged notice of intent to vacate the premises excused the 
premature notice to quit is not persuasive. The notice to pay 
rent or quit was served on November 20, 1991, the day after 
plaintiff notified defendant of its intent to vacate the premises 
by December 21, 1991 if things had not been worked out between 
the parties for an additional lease period. Defendant clearly 
set events in motion by serving a three-day notice to pay rent or 
quit when no rent was due and by threatening legal action if rent 
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was not paid or plaintiff failed to vacate the premises within 
three days. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S LEGAL AUTHORITY IS DISTINGUISHABLE 
Defendant attacks the cases cited by plaintiff from other 
jurisdictions for the proposition that service of the notice to 
quit can constitute constructive eviction. Defendant argues 
these cases are distinguishable from the present matter. Howev-
er, defendant fails to acknowledge that the case it cites, 
Lindenberg v. McDonald, 214 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1950) is distinguishable 
from the present case. Lindenberg does not involve a scenario 
where a notice to pay rent or quit was served upon a tenant who 
had paid rent. The case does not hold that because a notice to 
pay rent or quit provides alternatives, there can be no construc-
tive eviction. 
At any rate, to the extent Lindenberg can be construed to 
mean that more than a mere notice to quit is required to consti-
tute constructive eviction, plaintiff argues that such a rule is 
contrary to sound public policy and that the cases cited in its 
opening brief, Dobbins v. Paul, 231 S.E.2d 540 (N.C. App. 1984) 
and Routal Corp. N.W., Inc. v. Ottati, 391 S.2d 308 (Fla. App. 
1980), more closely set forth the appropriate standard that the 
service of a notice to quitf combined with the tenant's surrender 
or vacation of the premises, constitutes constructive eviction. 
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In short, in Utah, if a landlord improperly serves a notice to 
pay rent or quit when no rent is due, the tenant should be 
allowed to pursue the landlord for damages if the tenant relies 
on the notice and vacates the premises. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and plaintiff's opening Brief, 
plaintiff respectfully requests this court to rule that the trial 
court erred in holding a notice to quit, without more, cannot 
constitute constructive eviction, even when the rent has been 
paid and there is not rent due and owing. This court should hold 
that service of a notice to pay rent or quit when rent is not due 
constitutes a constructive or wrongful eviction. Furthermore, 
the order of the trial court requiring plaintiff to pay costs 
should be reversed. 
DATED this*w^_ day of June, 1994. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
I VfconaHdJ. Winder 
\ Robert D. Tingey 
\ John W. Holt 
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